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A major component of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was the
expansion of Medicaid eligibility to childless adults below 138% of the Federal Poverty Level.
Medicaid enrollment increased significantly in states that expanded eligibility, and it also in-
creased in states that did not expand eligibility. This increased take-up of insurance by indi-
viduals who were previously eligible for Medicaid is known as the "woodwork effect." With a
significant number of individuals now enrolled, this paper asks if those individuals were more
likely to utilize hospital services and whether their increased utilization affected hospital fi-
nances. Hospital financial data from all acute care hospitals in California, Florida, and Texas
is used to estimate a dynamic difference-in-differences (DD) instrumental variables model
where the "treated group" includes hospitals with higher shares of Medicaid visits pre-ACA
(i.e., safety-net hospitals), and the "control group" includes hospitals with lower shares of
Medicaid visits (i.e., non-safety-net hospitals). The results show that safety-net hospitals had
relatively more Medicaid visits post-ACA, but these increases were offset by decreases in vis-
its from uninsured patients and patients with private insurance. Therefore, safety-net hospitals
did not experience better financial performance as measured by operating profits compared to
non-safety-net hospitals. The results suggest that increased Medicaid demand does not neces-
sarily equate to increased profits, especially if there are changes in patient composition, such
as crowding out of private-pay patients.
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1 Introduction
Under the ACA, states were given the option to expand Medicaid starting in 2014. It was es-
timated that 11 million people became newly eligible in 2015 by the expansion (Rudowitz et al.
2016). Due to the media attention and publicity surrounding the ACA, Medicaid enrollment in-
creased even in non-expansion states, which is known as the "woodwork effect;" people who were
previously eligible for Medicaid "came out of the woodwork" to sign up for coverage from 2008 to
2013. The "woodwork effect" accounted for thirty percent of Medicaid enrollment increases in the
post-ACA period (Frean et al. 2017). It has been shown that when people gain health insurance
coverage, they are more likely to utilize hospital resources, particularly inpatient and outpatient
care (RAND HIE). Much of the literature surrounding the ACA has focused on how the Medi-
caid expansion has affected the uninsurance rate and healthcare utilization. However, much less
work has examined the effects of the ACA on hospital finances. This paper asks whether the ACA
affected Medicaid patient demand for hospital care, and whether greater demand from Medicaid
patients affected hospital finances in the post-ACA period.
Since state Medicaid programs typically set lower provider reimbursement rates than other
health insurers, this paper asks how the increase in Medicaid enrollment has affected hospital fi-
nances since 2009. One hypothesis is that hospital profits could increase if uncompensated care
decreases and net demand for hospital services increases. With Medicaid expansions, individu-
als who were previously unable to pay for hospital services became eligible for Medicaid, thus
decreasing uncompensated care costs. Dranove et al. 2016 show that uncompensated care costs
decreased more in hospitals in states that expanded Medicaid compared to hospitals in states that
did not expand. Uncompensated care costs declined the most in hospitals that treat a high share of
low-income patients (Camilleri 2017). Additionally, the individuals who enrolled in Medicaid uti-
lized more hospital resources, particularly preventative services (Simon et al. 2017), which could
have positively affected hospital profits.
On the other hand, increases in Medicaid enrollment could decrease hospital profits if Medi-
caid reimbursements are lower than the marginal cost of treating patients. Consequently, any gains
from an increase in demand for hospital services from Medicaid patients could be offset by low
reimbursement rates. In addition, the ACA called for a reduction in the federal Medicaid Dis-
proportionate Share Hospital (DSH) allotments targeted towards states with low percentages of
uninsured people. Although these reductions have not been implemented, the reductions would
likely negatively affect hospital finances. In California, for example, the decreases in uncompen-
sated care costs may not offset the DSH reductions, which would result in hospital financial losses
of up to $1.5 billion (Neuhausen et. al 2014).
In a related paper, Blavin (2016) estimates the association between the Medicaid expansion in
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2014 and hospital finances by comparing states that expanded to those that did not. He found that
hospitals in states that expanded had significantly increased Medicaid revenue, decreased uncom-
pensated care costs, and improvements in profit margins compared to hospitals in states that did
not expand. These findings were emphasized for hospitals that had high uninsurance rates prior to
the ACA. The Blavin (2016) paper is unique because it does not exclusively focus on uncompen-
sated care costs, but rather it examines overall hospital performance nationwide. In considering
factors such as the uninsurance rate and payer mix, its results suggest that expanding Medicaid
could benefit hospitals financially.
This paper uses a different identification strategy to determine the net effect of increased Med-
icaid enrollment on hospital finances and uses hospital financial data from California, Florida, and
Texas from 2005-2016. Hospitals are sorted by the percentage of hospital visits made by Medicaid
patients in the pre-ACA period (2005 to 2008), where hospital visits include inpatient, outpatient,
and emergency department visits. Hospitals with high shares of visits by Medicaid patients are
referred to as safety-net hospitals and hospitals with low shares are referred to as non-safety-net
hospitals. But the most distinguishing factor is that this paper takes advantage of the variation
induced by the woodwork effect in Florida and the Medicaid expansion in California to identify
differences in Medicaid demand across hospitals within states. Texas hospitals serve as a control
group because Texas neither had a "woodwork effect" nor did it expand Medicaid under the ACA.
By comparing hospitals within states over time, the estimates are not confounded by trends in
hospital finances that may differ across states.
The results show that new Medicaid demand at safety-net hospitals partially crowded out de-
mand from uninsured and private pay patients. The increase in Medicaid visits was offset by de-
creases in visits from uninsured and private pay patients. Although operating profits increased sub-
stantially for both safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals from 2005 to 2016, there is no evidence
that safety-net hospitals experienced better financial performance compared to non-safety-net hos-
pitals. The results suggest that safety-net hospitals in these three states did not benefit financially
from the increases in Medicaid enrollment, and that the overall increase in hospital profits over the
time period is likely due to other factors.
2 Literature Review
The ACA significantly affected insurance coverage in the US because it gave states the option
to expand Medicaid eligibility to childless adults with incomes below 138% of the Federal Poverty
Level. In a preliminary analysis of the ACA, Sommers et al. (2014) focuses on states that expanded
Medicaid coverage before 2014, such as California, Connecticut, Minnesota and Washington D.C.
He found strong evidence of increased Medicaid coverage in Connecticut and positive, but weaker
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evidence in Washington D.C. There was also evidence of some crowd-out of private coverage in
Connecticut. Selden et al. 2017 compares states that expanded under the ACA to states that did
not expand and found that the uninsurance rate for adults with family incomes of 100-138% of
the FPL declined by 22 percentage points in expansion states (Selden et al. 2017). To date, 32
states have expanded Medicaid while 18 have not. Even though some states have not expanded,
Medicaid enrollment has changed in some of those states as well.
The publicity related to the ACA caused some individuals who were already eligible for Med-
icaid to enroll in Medicaid, and this phenomenon is known as the "woodwork effect." There is ev-
idence that the woodwork effect was present in all states to varying degrees, regardless of whether
the state expanded Medicaid or not (Frean et al. 2016; Decker et al. 2017). A woodwork effect was
also observed in Massachusetts when it implemented its 2006 healthcare reform, and that reform
had many of the same features as the ACA (Sonier et al. 2013). Frean et al. 2016 show that the
replacement of private coverage with public coverage ("crowd-out") did not occur, but rather the
increase in private coverage in non-expansion states compared to expansion states was due to the
fact that low-income people in non-expansion states received health insurance coverage through
the ACA exchanges (Decker et al. 2017).
As the number of people who enroll in Medicaid increases, we might expect that they will
utilize more hospital services (RAND HIE). In assessing changes in utilization among low-income
adults after expanding either Medicaid or private insurance, Sommers et al. 2016 show that ex-
pansion of Medicaid and private coverage was associated with significant increases in outpatient
utilization. One unanswered question is whether the increase in Medicaid patient demand for hos-
pital services affected hospital finances.
The health economics literature has generated mixed results related to hospital financial perfor-
mance following the Medicaid expansions. Blavin (2016) compares hospital finances in states that
expanded Medicaid under the ACA versus states that did not expand Medicaid. He finds that hos-
pitals in states that expanded Medicaid had significantly increased Medicaid revenue, decreased
uncompensated care costs, and improvements in profit margins compared to hospitals in states that
did not expand. One limitation of this study is that he only uses data up to fiscal year 2014, so
he does not examine the effects of the expansion that occurred after January 1, 2014. Bazzoli
(2016) assesses the effects of California’s early Medicaid expansion program and finds that hospi-
tals that treated the most uninsured patients prior to the ACA did not experience substantial benefit
in reduced uninsured burden or better financial performance after the expansion.
Certain types of hospitals experienced improved financial performance as a result of the Med-
icaid expansions. For-profit hospitals benefitted with decreases in self-pay patients, increases in
county covered patients, and reductions in charity care (Bazolli 2016). Blavin (2017) also found
that hospital profit margins increased the most at small, for-profit, and non-federal government
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hospitals, and hospitals located in nonmetropolitan areas because of the ACA. Thus, the litera-
ture has largely found that safety-net hospitals have been the least likely to benefit from the ACA
Medicaid expansions.
This paper is most similar to Bazzoli (2016) and Blavin et al. (2017) because it asks how
increased Medicaid enrollment affected hospital financial performance in safety-net hospitals rela-
tive to non-safety-net hospitals. It uses data on the universe of acute care hospitals with emergency
departments in CA, FL, and TX from 2005-2016. The empirical strategy compares hospitals within
states over time to show how increased Medicaid demand for hospital care affected the number of
hospital visits by payer type, total revenues by payer type, and total operating profits. The results
show that increased Medicaid demand at safety-net hospitals crowded out demand from the unin-
sured and private pay patients, so there was no net increase in total patient demand at safety-net
hospitals. As a result, operating profits in safety-net hospitals did not increase relative to non-
safety-net hospitals. The results are most consistent with Blavin’s study because both findings
suggest that certain types of hospitals, whether it be safety-net hospitals or ones that treated the
most uninsured prior to the ACA, did not experience better financial performance relative to their
counterparts.
3 Data and Methods
This paper asks whether hospital finances were affected by the woodwork effect and the ACA
Medicaid expansion in 2014. I use hospital financial data from all acute care hospitals in California,
Florida, and Texas to estimate a dynamic difference-in-differences (DD) instrumental variables
model using the share of total patient demand coming from Medicaid patients in the pre-ACA
period (2005 - 2008) as the instrument. The "treated group" includes hospitals with higher shares of
Medicaid visits in the pre-ACA period (i.e., safety-net hospitals), and the "control group" includes
hospitals with lower shares of Medicaid visits. I use the increase in Medicaid demand for hospital
care that resulted from California’s 2014 Medicaid expansion and Florida’s woodwork effect that
started in 2009 to estimate the relationship between Medicaid hospital visits and hospital operating
profits, total revenue, and revenues and visits by patients with different types of insurance.
3.1 Data and Sample Statistics
The data for this study included hospital financial data from California, Florida, and Texas from
2005 to 2016. The Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHD) in California
provides desk-audited, quarterly financial and utilization data collected from all licensed hospitals.
This data contains facility-level data on service capacity, revenues and expenses by payer, and
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utilization by payer. In addition, I used ED data by facility that includes patient demographic
information, treatment information, and expected source of payment.
The Florida Agency for Healthcare Administration (AHCA) collects detailed hospital level
financial reports that all hospitals are required to file. These financial reports contain statements
of patient care revenues and deductions by payer for inpatient and outpatient services, patient care
services expenses, balance sheet information, and operating costs. The Agency has 90 days to
conduct an initial review of the report and reports are deemed acceptable when all corrections are
made.
The Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS), along with the American Hospital
Association (AHA) and the Texas Hospital Association (THA) combined an annual survey into
a single questionnaire that all licensed hospitals in Texas are required to submit under state laws
(Health and Safety Code, Chapters 104 and 311) within 60 days of receipt of the survey form.
Verification sheets are sent out that allow hospitals 30 days to review and make any changes before
the data is considered final. This survey includes extensive financial and utilization data by facility.
It includes revenue by payer, admissions by payer, and ER visits by Medicare and Medicaid.
All acute care hospitals with emergency departments were selected as part of the study sample.
Hospital visits include inpatient, outpatient, and ED visits. Visits are then categorized by payer
which include Medicaid, Medicare, private, and self-pay. Private pay usually means the patient
has employer-sponsored health insurance. Self-pay means the patient is uninsured. Total revenue
includes net patient revenue, other operating revenue and non-operating revenue. Total revenues
are also partitioned by payer and it is important to note that total revenues represent total charges for
services, not the total net revenues which the hospitals are paid. Total operating profits measures
the profitability of hospitals and is defined as net patient revenue plus other operating revenue
minus total expenses.
Table 1 shows finance and discharge variables for hospitals in all three states from 2005 to 2008.
California hospitals had the highest percentage of Medicaid visits (22%), compared to FL hospitals
with 19%, and TX hospitals with 13%. As expected, this contrast was also reflected through
Medicaid revenue: California hospitals had the highest Medicaid revenues of $128.75 million and
Texas hospitals had the lowest Medicaid revenues of $44.98 million. California hospitals also had
the highest number of Medicaid visits with 37,000 while Florida hospitals had the lowest with
9,000; however, Florida hospitals treat fewer patients overall compared to hospitals in California
and Texas. Hospitals in all states maintained operating profits between $1-2 million and total net
revenue between $100-200 million.
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3.2 Methods
To estimate the effects of increased Medicaid enrollment on hospital visits, revenues, and op-
erating profits, I estimate a dynamic difference-in-differences (DD) instrumental variables model,
where I first create a variable for each hospital that measures the share of hospital visits made by
Medicaid patients before 2009. Then I interact that “treatment” variable with year dummy vari-
ables from 2009-2016. For ease of interpretation, I refer to hospitals with high shares of Medicaid
visits as “safety-net” hospitals and hospitals with lower shares of Medicaid visits as “non-safety-
net” hospitals. The first stage model uses a DD estimator in which the safety-net hospitals are
the "treated group" and the non-safety-net hospitals are the "control group." The hypothesis is that
safety-net hospitals received relatively more Medicaid visits in the post-ACA period relative to
non-safety-net hospitals. The estimation strategy controls for year and hospital fixed effects as
well as hospital-specific linear time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital-level. The
first stage model for estimation is,
#Medicaid_V isitsit = γt + δi + Ωt′δi +
2016∑
j=2009
βj(%Medicaidi ∗ Postjt) + uit(1)
where the number of Medicaid visits in hospital i in year t is the outcome variable. γt and δi are
year and hospital fixed effects, respectively. Ωt′δi represents hospital specific linear time trends.
%Medicaidi is the share of visits by Medicaid patients and it is multiplied by 10 for a more realistic
interpretation of the coefficients. βj is the incremental change in Medicaid visits in post-period
year j that compares hospitals with 10% higher shares of Medicaid visits ("safety-net") in the pre-
period to hospitals with lower shares ("non-safety-net"). When I estimate the model separately by
state, Postjt are indicator variables for j years 2009 to 2016 (when "treatment" is in effect). When
I combine the states and re-estimate the model, the value of Postjt equals 0 for all years in Texas
because I find no evidence of a differential woodwork effect across hospitals in Texas. Similarly,
Postjt equals 0 until 2014 in California because there is no differential woodwork effect across
hospitals in California until the Medicaid expansion in 2014. Both sets of results appear in Table
2.
Next, I use the same DD model to estimate the reduced form effects of increased Medicaid
enrollment on other hospital discharge variables and financial outcomes:
Yit = γt + δi + Ωt′δi +
2016∑
j=2009
βj(%Medicaidi ∗ Posttj) + uit(2)
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where Yit represents total hospital visits, Medicaid visits, Medicare visits, other visits (total visits
excluding Medicare and Medicaid), operating profits, total revenue, Medicaid revenue, self-pay
"revenue", private revenue, and Medicare revenue.
Finally, I use the predicted Medicaid demand in each hospital from 2005-2016 from the first
stage model to plug into the second stage model to estimate how an additional Medicaid visit
affects hospital finances. Thus, the IV model is identified from the variation that comes from
comparing safety-net hospitals to non-safety-net hospitals before and after the ACA. The second
stage is defined as follows,
Yit = γt + δi + Ωt′δi + β1 ˆ#Medicaid_V isitsit + uit(3)
where Yit includes operating revenue, total revenue, total net revenue, revenue by payer, and visits
by payer. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital-level. I use the “ivreg 2sls” command in
Stata to estimate the dynamic DD instrumental variables model.
4 Results
California, Florida, and Texas had varying degrees of woodwork effects and differ when it
comes to the ACA Medicaid expansion in 2014. Florida did not expand Medicaid eligibility under
the ACA, but it experienced the largest woodwork effect of all the states that did not expand
eligibility (Ryan 2014). Texas did not expand Medicaid but experienced a small woodwork effect.
California expanded Medicaid in 2014 under the ACA, and also had a small woodwork effect.
Graph 1 shows how the woodwork effect and Medicaid expansion affected the demand for hospital
care. Graph 1 shows the average number of Medicaid visits per hospital by state over time. There
is a slight increase from 2008 and 2009 in all three states, where the number of Medicaid visits
per hospital reached over 10,000 in Florida, 20,000 in Texas, and 40,000 in California. There
is a much larger increase in California starting in 2013 with around 42,000 Medicaid visits per
hospital, which increased to over 70,000 by 2016. The increase in Medicaid hospital visits is
largely explained by the ACA Medicaid expansion in California.
It is important to note that Graph 1 merely represents the number of Medicaid visits, so Graph
2 shows how the number of Medicaid visits compares to visits from patients with other types of
insurance by plotting the share of total visits by Medicaid patients. In this graph, the woodwork
effect is distinctly illustrated and confirms previous research findings (Ryan 2014). Texas did not
experience much of a woodwork effect, which is shown by the rather flat line across the years.
Florida experienced a large woodwork effect which is illustrated by the abrupt increase from 2008
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to 2013; the percent of Medicaid visits per hospital increased from 19% in 2008 to 27% by 2013.
There is a 1% increase in the share of Medicaid visits in California during this time frame as well,
but it is meager compared to the 10% increase that occurs in CA from 2013 to 2016, which reflects
the Medicaid eligibility expansion.
Did the increase in Medicaid enrollment lead to changes in hospital profitability? Graph 3
shows how hospital profits evolved from 2005-2016 in CA, FL, and TX. Operating profits stayed
relatively flat until 2008, at which point they started to increase and continued to increase for the
remaining years. An average hospital in Florida generated close to $1 million in operating profits
before 2009 and reached over $20 million by 2016. Average hospital profits in CA and TX follow
similar trends and are similar in magnitude. It is interesting to point out that the years undergoing
the largest increases: 2008 to 2009 and 2013 to 2014 correspond to the years the woodwork effect
and the Medicaid expansion began. Thus, Graph 3 suggests that increased Medicaid enrollment
may have increased hospital profits; however, there could be other reasons why hospital profits
increased. There were many other policy changes, and changes in hospital markets, in the years
following the Great Recession. Therefore, I turn to the estimation strategy to identify the causal
effect of increased Medicaid enrollment on hospital profits.
Table 2 shows the first stage results from (Equation 1). First I estimate the results by state,
and those results appear in the first four columns of Table 2. Then I aggregate all three states and
re-estimate the results and report the aggregated results in the fifth column of the table. In the
first column, hospitals in Florida with 10% higher shares of Medicaid patients in the pre-period
received 950 more Medicaid visits in 2009. I will refer to the hospitals that had 10% higher shares
of Medicaid patients as safety-net hospitals going forward. The results show that safety-net hos-
pitals in Florida received relatively more Medicaid demand each year, particularly from 2009 to
2010, than non-safety-net hospitals for all years, with the exception of 2016. In contrast, safety-net
hospitals in Texas experienced insignificant decreases in Medicaid visits compared to non-safety-
net hospitals in Texas. Due to the particularly large standard errors and insignificant results, there
was not much of a differential woodwork effect across safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals in
Texas. Although we do not see significant results in California in the third column, the sign of the
coefficients is positive. Up until 2014, safety-net hospitals were receiving relatively less Medicaid
demand. But they received 1,754 more Medicaid visits than non-safety-net hospitals in 2014 and
it continued to increase onwards. The results in columns 3 suggest that there was no differential
woodwork effect across safety-net and and non-safety-net hospitals in CA from 2009-2013, but the
Medicaid expansion had a larger effect on safety-net hospitals in CA than non-safety-net hospitals.
Thus, column 4 shows results from re-estimating the model, but redefining the pre-period from
2005-2013. We now see large and significant results, where safety-net hospitals received about
5,000 more Medicaid visits compared to non-safety-net hospitals by 2016. Taking into account
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context and the results that we observe by state, the pre-period was adjusted for Texas and Cali-
fornia when the states were combined. All hospitals in Texas from 2005-2016 and all hospitals in
California from 2005-2013 were treated as “control hospitals” (i.e., %Medicaid∗Post = 0 for all
i in those states in those years). After making this change, I combine the data for these three states,
re-estimate the first stage model, and see that safety-net hospitals had significantly more Medicaid
visits compared to non-safety-net hospitals in the post-ACA period (column 5).
Table 3 shows the reduced form effects of increased Medicaid enrollment on hospital visits by
patients with different types of insurance (i.e., payer). Safety-net hospitals received 2,191 fewer
total visits in 2009 compared to non-safety-net hospitals and continued to receive fewer visits
until 2013. It is not until 2014 that there is a net (insignificant) increase in total visits, which
could indicate new demand induced by the individual mandate. Although there is an increase in
Medicaid demand for safety-net hospitals relative to non-safety-net hospitals, it is offset by the
significant decreases in other types of visits. Other visits is defined as all visits except Medicaid
and Medicare. The results in Table 3 suggest that the increase in Medicaid visits at safety-net
hospitals was accompanied by crowd-out of visits from patients who were uninsured or who had
private insurance.1
Table 4 shows the reduced form effects of increased Medicaid enrollment on hospital finances.
There are no significant changes in operating profits and total revenue. Safety-net hospitals had
insignificant decreases in total revenue relative to non-safety-net hospitals, except during 2016.
This could be due to the fact that safety-net hospitals treated more Medicaid patients, who are
not as profitable as other types of patients. As expected, these hospitals also received much more
Medicaid revenue. In 2016, safety-net hospitals received $26 million more in Medicaid revenue
compared to non-safety-net hospitals. Meanwhile, both self-pay and private pay revenue decreased
for safety-net hospitals, providing further evidence that Medicaid demand crowded out demand
from uninsured and private pay patients.
Table 5 summarizes the previous results using the two-stage least squares estimation frame-
work. Additional visits by Medicaid patients did not affect hospital financial outcomes such as
operating profits, total revenues, or total net revenues, where total net revenues convert hospital
charges to the amount of revenue that hospitals actually receive for treating patients. An additional
Medicaid visit increased Medicaid revenue (i.e., charges) by $3,310, decreased self-pay revenue
by $647, decreased private pay revenue by $1,195, and decreased Medicare revenue by $985. An
additional Medicaid visit decreased other visits by about 0.6-persons, so the crowd-out rate was
about 60%. Overall, the increase in Medicaid demand in CA, FL, and TX did not improve hospital
1I cannot separate visits by uninsured vs. private pay patients because the Texas hospital financial data does not
report that information for emergency department and outpatient visits. I can, however, separate total revenues from
self-pay patients vs. private pay patients in all states, so I present those results in Table 4.
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profitability, possibly because Medicaid demand crowded out demand from other types of patients
at safety-net hospitals.
Although increased Medicaid demand did not affect hospital operating profits, Graph 4 shows
that operating profits increased in both non-safety-net and safety-net hospitals, starting in 2008. I
separated hospitals based on their shares of total visits by Medicaid patients in the pre-ACA period
(2005-2008), where the shares equal the number of Medicaid visits divided by the number of total
visits. Safety-net hospitals include hospitals in the top quartile of the percentage of Medicaid
visits, while non-safety-net hospitals include hospitals below the top quartile for the percentage
of Medicaid visits. From 2005-2008, safety-net hospitals had negative operating profits, and non-
safety-net hospitals earned about $4 million in operating profits. By 2015, safety-net hospitals
were generating over $10 million in operating profits, while non-safety-net hospitals were earning
close to $20 million. Thus, the difference in hospital profits between the two groups remained
constant, yet all hospitals became more profitable.
There are two explanations for why profits increased at both types of hospitals. The first is
that safety-net hospital profits increased because they received less uncompensated care as pa-
tients switched to Medicaid, while non-safety-net hospital profits increased because the hospitals
received more demand from patients with private coverage. However, the second explanation is
that the increases in Medicaid enrollment had no effect on hospital profits, and that hospital profits
started to increase in 2008 for reasons that were unrelated to changes in Medicaid policy. These
hypotheses could be investigated using hospital discharge data.
5 Discussion
This paper asks how increases in Medicaid enrollment affect demand for hospital care and
hospital finances, and it compares safety-net to non-safety-net hospitals from the pre-ACA pe-
riod (2005-2008) to the post-ACA period (2009-2014). Theoretically, as Medicaid enrollment in-
creases, hospital profits could increase if uncompensated care decreases. However, hospital profits
could decrease if Medicaid reimburses below marginal cost. This paper shows that safety-net hos-
pitals, which experienced greater Medicaid demand for hospital services as a result of the ACA’s
woodwork effects and Medicaid expansions, did not experience greater profitability compared to
non-safety-net hospitals.
There is also significant evidence that Medicaid demand at safety-net hospitals crowded out
demand from uninsured and private-pay patients. Future research could explore whether safety-
net hospitals were capacity-constrained, and how they triaged patients as demand for hospital
care from Medicaid patients increased. The influx of Medicaid patients could have caused safety-
net hospitals to relocate other types of patients, such as private pay patients, to other hospitals
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because of limited space and resources. Safety-net hospitals may have benefited from treating
fewer uninsured patients, while at the same time, non-safety-net hospitals may have benefited
from treating more private pay patients who got deferred from safety-net hospitals. Future research
could explore these compositional changes in patient visits across different types of hospitals by
using hospital discharge data.
Future Medicaid eligibility expansions would likely result in greater crowd-out of private pay
patients at safety-net hospitals because expansions would affect people at higher points in the
income distribution. Additional Medicaid eligibility expansions could further reduce uncompen-
sated care, but also entice people with private insurance to switch to Medicaid, which has less
cost-sharing. It is not clear whether such expansions would benefit hospitals financially. Perhaps if
additional Medicaid expansions were coupled with higher hospital reimbursement rates for Medi-
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7 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Source: California OSHD, Florida AHCA, Texas DSHS hospital financial data
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Table 2: The Effects of the ACA on Medicaid Visits in Safety-Net vs. Non-Safety-Net Hospi-
tals
Notes: The first four columns present results comparing safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals using (Equation 1) by state while the fifth column
presents results when the states are combined. Results are estimated using California, Florida, and Texas hospital financial data from 2005 to 2016.
The outcome variable is the number of Medicaid visits. The independent variables are the percent of Medicaid visits before 2009 interacted with
year dummy-variables from 2009 to 2016. Each regression controls for year and hospital fixed effects, along with hospital specific-linear time
trends. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital level and appear in parentheses. Due to the expansion in California in 2014 and no differential
woodwork effect across hospitals in CA, Column 4 presents results defining the pre-period before 2014 in CA, rather than before 2009.
18
Table 3: The Effects of the ACA on Hospital Visits in Safety-Net vs. Non-Safety-Net Hospitals
Notes: Each column presents results comparing safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals using (Equation 2) when state data are combined. Results
are estimated using California, Florida, and Texas hospital financial data from 2005 to 2016. The outcome variables include total visits, Medicaid
visits, Medicare visits, and Other Visits (total visits excluding Medicaid and Medicare). The independent variables are the percent of Medicaid
visits before 2009 interacted with year dummy-variables from 2009 to 2016. Each regression controls for year and hospital fixed effects, along with
hospital specific-linear time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital level and appear in parentheses.
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Table 4: The Effects of the ACA on Hospital Finances in Safety-Net vs. Non-Safety-Net
Hospitals
Notes: Each column presents results comparing safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals using (Equation 2) when state data are combined. Results
are estimated using California, Florida, and Texas hospital financial data from 2005 to 2016. The outcome variables include operating profits, total
revenue, Medicaid revenue, self-pay “revenue", private revenue, and Medicare revenue. The independent variables are the percent of Medicaid
visits before 2009 interacted with year dummy-variables from 2009 to 2016. Each regression controls for year and hospital fixed effects, along with
hospital specific-linear time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital level and appear in parentheses.
20
Table 5: The Effects of Increased Medicaid Demand on Hospital Visits & Finances
Notes: Each estimate is calculated using the 2SLS method described in (Equation 3), where the first stage equation is described in (Equation 1).
Results are estimated using California, Florida, and Texas hospital financial data from 2005 to 2016. The outcome variables include operating profit,
total revenue, total net revenue, total expenses, Medicaid revenue, Medicare revenue, self-Pay "revenue", private revenue, total visits, Medicare
visits, and other visits (total visits excluding Medicaid and Medicare). The independent variable is number of Medicaid visits. Each regression


































Average # Medicaid Visits Per Hospital By State

































% of Total Visits by Medicaid Patients Per Hospital By State























Average Operating Profit Per Hospital By State























Average Operating Profit By Type of Hospital
Notes: Hospitals are separated based on their shares of total visits by Medicaid patients in the pre-ACA period (2005-2008), where the shares equal
the number of Medicaid visits divided by the number of total visits. Safety-net hospitals include hospitals in the top quartile of the percentage of
Medicaid visits, while non-safety-net hospitals include hospitals below the top quartile for the percentage of Medicaid visits
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